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THE NEED FOR A LENIENT ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD FOR 
DEFENSE FORENSIC EVIDENCE 
Myeonki Kim* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The reliability of forensic evidence is crucial to the search for 
truth.1 However, when DNA evidence began to reveal wrongful 
convictions in the 1990s, doubts about the reliability of forensic 
evidence increased.2 The influential report, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward,3 published by the 
National Research Council (“NRC”) in 2009 (“2009 NRC Report”), 
confirmed most of these suspicions.4 The report declared that many 
forensic disciplines lack a sufficient scientific basis and that courts 
had failed to filter out problematic forensic evidence.5  
The impacts were huge. Forensic practitioners, lawyers, and 
academics have taken seriously the lessons of the 2009 NRC Report. 
However, there is an imbalance in the efforts for change. 6 Since 
2009, demands for reform in forensic disciplines have significantly 
increased, and governmental support for reforms followed.7 In 
contrast, the courts remain reluctant to strictly review the reliability 
of forensic evidence.8 Although the authority of the report is widely 
acknowledged, it has not governed the admissibility of individual 
pieces of evidence.  Simply put, courts have failed to rigorously 
monitor the quality of forensic evidence, at least when that evidence 
is proffered by the prosecution. 
 The problem is that forensic practices cannot be improved 
 
* Senior Inspector, Korean National Police Agency. S.J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 2017.  
I would like to thank Professor Keith A. Findley, Carrie Sperling, and Steven Wright for their helpful 
comments this Article.  All errors are mine alone. 
 1. This is because expert testimony generally addresses areas beyond juror’s knowledge and 
therefore is very influential to lay person. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (An expert witness may testify if his 
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” (emphasis added). With the emergence of modern science, the 
number of cases requiring expert witnesses surged. Therefore, providing reliable and qualified expert 
testimony is the core of today’s trial. 
 2. See infra Part II.A.  
 3. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCES COMMUNITY, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NRC REPORT]. 
 4. See infra note 34–43 & accompanying text. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See infra Part II.C. 
 7. See infra note 77–86 & accompanying text. 
 8. See infra note 87–89 & accompanying text. 
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independently from court policy.9 Another important report that was 
recently published by the President's Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology (“2016 PCAST Report”) indicated that after 2009, 
only a few empirical studies had been conducted to measure the 
accuracy of forensic method.10 Therefore, if the courts are not strict 
in excluding unreliable forensic evidence, practices will remain the 
same, with little incentive to change.11 Although the courts have 
made some efforts to strengthen defendant’s constitutional rights, 
they have not been enough.12 
 This article argues that, given this landscape, a new approach to 
admissibility of forensic evidence is required to level the playing 
field and create incentives for improving the reliability of forensic 
evidence.13 Perhaps counter-intuitively, this article argues that the 
most effective way to respond to the deficiencies in the forensic 
sciences and the lax admissibility of forensic science evidence is to 
lower the admissibility standard of forensic evidence (under the 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. standard) for defendants, 
on the condition that the evidence they are proffering is related to the 
prosecution’s evidence.14 It analyzes the impact of the 2009 NRC 
Report and the court’s on-going reluctance to exclude government 
forensic evidence, and explains why an asymmetric standard is 
necessary.15 If it is difficult for courts to strictly apply the Daubert 
standard to the prosecution, then it is fair to also apply a lenient 
standard to the defense. It would allow defendants to present their 
own stories and to rebut prosecution experts more effectively. Given 
the limited impact of the 2009 NRC Report and the limitations of 
internal reform, perhaps the only way to rigorously test the reliability 
of forensic evidence is to allow extensive attacks on the evidence in 
the courtrooms. This change will also help realize the proposals in 
2016 PCAST report.16 
It might be argued that a lowered standard would cause (1) the 
introduction of junk science; and (2) juror confusion and inconsistent 
verdicts. These are reasonable concerns. Therefore, this article 
 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL 
COURTS ENSURING VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS at 7–14 (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter 
2016 PCAST REPORT], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp /PCAST/pcast 
forensic science report final.pdf. 
 11. See infra note 111–12 & accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra note 92–107 & accompanying text. 
 16. 2016 PCAST REPORT, supra note 10, at 14–20. 
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presents specific examples and cases in which it is appropriate to 
lower the standard for admissibility.17 This article also contends that 
concerns about juror confusion and inconsistent results are 
exaggerated.18 
There are legal grounds for granting defendants a more lenient 
standard than the prosecution: the defendant enjoys constitutionally 
guaranteed rights to present favorable evidence.19 In addition, this 
article’s proposal will contribute to weighing the expert testimony in 
the court, in a more scientific way. Science—at least science used in 
the courtroom—could be developed and strengthened through 
adversarial testing.20 Thus, the prosecution’s forensic evidence is 
expected to be made stronger and more reliable by confronting 
conflicting evidence.21  
 Part II analyzes the recent discussions about forensic science, 
focusing on increased doubts following the 2009 NRC Report and 
recent efforts for reform. Part III reveals that the courts are still 
reluctant to examine the reliability of forensic evidence when 
proffered by the prosecution, and points out that reform is limited 
without strong judicial enforcement. Part IV argues the need to apply 
the Daubert standard leniently for defendants, both as a means of 
leveling the playing field and as a way to improve forensic evidence 
in general. Specific methods will be provided for analyzing the 
qualification of experts and the relevance and validity of forensic 
evidence.  
II. RECENT DISCUSSIONS AND CHANGES IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 
A. Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions 
For decades, there have been growing concerns about the 
reliability of forensic science, mostly from academics.22 Starting in 
the early 1990s, with the emergence of the Innocence Movement, 
many scholars began in earnest to warn about the doubtful accuracy 
 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. See infra Part IV.C. 
 19. See infra note 173–75 & accompanying text. 
 20. See infra note 162–66 & accompanying text. 
 21. See infra note 157–61 & accompanying text. 
 22. D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught 
With Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 225, 225 (“For several decades now, many from the academy and 
some from forensic science itself have pointed to weaknesses both in various forensic fields and in the 
structure of forensic science practice itself—weaknesses that raised the specter of a forensic science that 
sometimes made unwarranted claims and that could in practice sometimes aid in the conviction of the 
innocent.”). 
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of many forensic fields, even labeling some “junk science.”23 
However, these efforts received scant attention. Even though some 
flawed forensic science was proven to contribute to wrongful 
convictions, it was generally regarded as merely the bad luck of the 
convicted.24 And as Professor Michael Risinger indicated, “[these 
problems] were generally dismissed without much examination by 
the bulk of the forensic science establishment, and the proponents of 
those claims were dismissed as well.”25 More seriously, many 
criminal justice officials, and portions of the general public, were 
reluctant to believe that exonerees were actually innocent.26 Thus, 
after experiencing these tragedies, exonerees were not treated fairly 
and compensation remained absurdly low.27  
 However, the status quo in forensic science was significantly 
changed by the development of DNA technology.28 First, DNA 
testing, which disproved findings in some of the other forensic 
disciplines, confirmed nascent suspicions about many forensic 
sciences.29 Because of its concrete scientific basis, exonerations by 
DNA testing almost always included proof of actual innocence. 
During the two decades following the first exoneration in 1989, 156 
wrongfully convicted persons were freed after DNA testing, and 82 
 
 23. Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 
(1993) (urging a greater junk science discussion in criminal prosecution). 
 24. Lucian E. Dervan et al., Voices on Innocence, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747604 (claiming that before the DNA era, 
“[wrongful convictions] were either ignored or treated as individual tragedies, one-offs, rather than as 
illustrative of a criminal justice system that was structurally and persistently prone to factual error”). 
 25. Risinger, supra note 22, at 225. 
 26. One of the most infamous resistances to believe the actual innocence of exonerees is the co-
ejaculation theory of the prosecutor in Texas. See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. 
REV. 1157, 1181 (2010) (“In Texas, after Roy Criner was convicted of a 1986 rape and murder of a 
young girl, post-conviction DNA testing on semen from the victim's body excluded Criner. Nonetheless, 
prosecutors resisted Criner's claim of innocence and convinced the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
that the DNA evidence was insufficient to prove innocence because Criner could have been wearing a 
condom, failed to ejaculate, or the semen could have been from a prior consensual sexual encounter-
although those theories had never been presented in the case previously.”) (citation omitted). 
 27. John Shaw, Exoneration and the Road to Compensation: The Tim Cole Act and 
Comprehensive Compensation for Persons Wrongfully Imprisoned, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 593 
(2011) (discussing insufficient compensation for exonerees and proposing a reform model similar with 
Texas case). 
 28. Dervan et al., supra note 24, at 7 (noting that “[t]he DNA exoneration cases in the 1990s and 
2000s, of course, changed everything”). 
 29. As of now, among 349 DNA exoneration cases, 46% cases were found to involve the 
misapplication of forensic science. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-
exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). If one includes cases without DNA testing, 
467 of 1976 wrongful convictions were attributable to problematic forensic science. See THE NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2017).   
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of those cases involved flawed forensic evidence.30 It became 
unacceptable to tolerate fallible forensic science and many legal 
professionals, especially academics, increasingly recognized the need 
for a scientific basis for forensic evidence.31 Unlike DNA evidence, 
most traditional forensic evidence did not have a sufficient scientific 
ground.32 When it came to forensic testimony, most actors in the 
criminal justice system had long assumed that forensic scientists’ 
field experience and training background would guarantee 
reliability.33 The comparatively rich scientific features of DNA 
evidence, however, revealed the weak scientific basis of other 
forensic evidence. Nonetheless, despite this awareness, significant 
change in forensic fields has not happened. 
Most would agree that 2009 was the watershed moment in forensic 
science communities.34 When publishing the 2009 NRC Report, the 
NRC severely criticized current forensic science practices and 
confirmed many growing concerns.35 Particularly shocking to the 
relevant communities was the harsh criticism in the report of forensic 
methodology.36 The NRC wrote:  
 
With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no forensic 
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a 
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.37 
  
This meant that even fingerprint technology, which had long been 
 
 30. This data comes from one empirical study conducted in 2009. See Brandon L. Garret & Peter 
J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). 
Here, the data of these two decades is given here because this section reviews changes before and after 
the 2009 NRC Report.  
 31. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How forensic Science Lost 
Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 149 (2008). 
 32. See infra note 51–65 & accompanying text. 
 33. Jennifer L. Mnookin, et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 725, 745 (2011) (“In court, forensic analysts asked about the bases for their claims 
frequently refer to experience and training rather than providing any systematic data. Experience is a 
legitimate basis for certain kinds of knowledge, but it is deeply problematic for experience alone to be 
the basis for sweeping claims like individualization. Moreover, without robust feedback mechanisms to 
detect and provide information about any possible mistake, experience cannot be a sound warrant for 
reaching valid conclusions.”) (citation omitted). 
 34. See, e.g., Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 729; D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report 
on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught With Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 225, 225–26; William 
C. Thompson, The National Research Council’s Plan to Strengthen Forensic Science: Does the Path 
Forward Run through the Courts, 55 JURISMETRICS 35, 35–36 (2009). 
 35. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3. 
 36. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli et al., Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 55, 71, n.91 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 3d ed., 2011). 
 37. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (emphasis added). 
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considered the gold standard for evidence, could also be fallible.38  
 In its groundbreaking report, the NRC comprehensively reviewed 
the principal forensic science disciplines (mostly involving trace 
evidence) and noted the strengths and weaknesses of each forensic 
field.39 The report also critically analyzed the admissibility of 
forensic science.40 The NRC then listed suggestions for improving 
reliability and strengthening oversight of forensic science.41 As a way 
to implement these reforms, the NRC ambitiously suggested creation 
of “an independent federal entity, the National Institute of Forensic 
Science (“NIFS”).”42 The NRC believed that a new, independent 
federal agency was necessary because existing forensic agencies in 
the United State are too fragmented and no existing federal agency 
possessed the requisite expertise and independence.43    
The report’s recommendations generated huge political debates.44 
In addition, many criminal justice professionals were antagonistic to 
the report.45 It seemed that only a small number of scholars, with 
minimal political power to realize change, were satisfied with the 
report. Thus, big changes have not yet occurred. Instead of the 
creation of new federal entity, a new forensics organization, in 2013, 
National Commission on Forensic Science (“NCFS”),46 was 
established through the cooperation of the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”).47 With the new organization, reforms on forensic science 
are now on-going, although they are not as comprehensive as the 
2009 NRC Report envisioned.   
 
 38. The most frequently cited case to support this claim might be the FBI’s infamous 
misidentification in the Madrid bombing attack. See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous 
Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706, 
706 (2004). 
 39. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, Part V. 
 40. Id. at Part III. 
 41. Id. at Part VI, VII, VIII. 
 42. Id. at 19. 
 43. Id. at 14–18. 
 44. Risinger, supra note 22, at 238, 239 (discussing the conflict between Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress).  
 45. Id. at 237, 239. 
 46. See Press Release, U.S. Departments of Justice and Commerce Name Experts to First-ever 
National Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/January/14-at-029.html. 
 47. Simon Cole & Gary Edmond, Science without Precedent: The Impact of the National 
Research Council Report on the Admissibility and Use of Forensic Science Evidence in the United 
States, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 585, 613 (2015). 
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B. Why Forensic Science Had Remained Outdated and Yet Admissible in 
Court 
One may wonder why forensic science has remained so outdated, 
even into the early 21st century. Given the remarkable development 
of modern science, this lag in forensic science seems strange. One 
may also wonder why the judicial system has consistently failed to 
exclude flawed forensic evidence. If judges had scrupulously 
reviewed the reliability of forensic evidence, they might have 
prevented a significant number of wrongful convictions involving 
problematic forensic science. 
These points are particularly distinguishable from the development 
of DNA evidence and jurisprudence regarding its admissibility. 
Immediately after the advent of DNA technology, academics, 
forensic science communities, and judiciaries endeavored to achieve 
a high degree of certainty. Long before the 2009 NRC Report, the 
NRC demonstrated a high level of interest in DNA, publishing two 
reports in 1992 and 1996.48 The courts were also careful about 
admitting DNA evidence because of its powerful influence on fact-
finders.49 Because of these efforts, most relevant professionals now 
accept DNA evidence as the most reliable scientific evidence. It is 
this high confidence in DNA evidence that has produced hundreds of 
exonerations.50 Recognizing this short history of DNA evidence 
helps one understand two distinct characteristics found in other types 
of forensic evidence.  
First, many forensic disciplines lack important features normally 
found in scientific fields. These features are well explained in the 
2009 NRC Report. The report noted that the scientific method 
involves a series of systematic steps to accumulate data; continuous 
observation, testing, and modification; methods to reduce errors and 
bias; ultimate explanations of broad scientific principles; and so on.51 
The report also listed key elements of good scientific practice when 
creating new scientific theories.52 These elements include “precision 
when defining terms, processes, context, results, and limitations; 
 
 48. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996). 
 49. Thompson, supra note 34, at 41-44 (explaining the courts’ careful approach in admitting 
DNA evidence in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 50. But some criticize about blind faith in DNA evidence. See ERIN MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: 
THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA at xi (2015) (“Generally speaking, [the] enthusiasm for DNA typing 
is not misguided, and it is not wrong. DNA typing is a marked advance over more primitive forensic 
method. It does rely on scientifically established principles and mathematically sound statistics. . . . But 
revolutionary does not mean infallible, and better does not mean faultless.”). 
 51. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 112. 
 52. Id. 
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openness to new ideas, including criticism and refutation; and 
protections against bias and overstatement (going beyond the 
facts).”53 The report said that these principles for creating new 
scientific knowledge could also be applied to the strengthening of 
forensic science.54 These characteristics, which would make forensic 
science more scientific, are rarely found in forensic disciplines. 
This is because, historically, forensic science has been developed 
and followed by forensic practitioners in police laboratories, rather 
than by scientists in research institutions where most scientific 
studies are conducted. Professor Jennifer L. Mnookin observed that 
forensic scientists generally rely on “experience and training rather 
than providing any systematic data” for “the bases [of] their 
claims.”55 Also, forensic communities are “willing to infer scientific 
validity from the fact of longstanding use.”56 These practices are far 
from the normal scientific methods described above. Mnookin noted 
that, “without robust feedback mechanisms to detect and provide 
information about any possible mistake, experience cannot be a 
sound warrant for reaching valid conclusions.”57 “Convictions,” she 
emphasized, “do not necessarily establish the accuracy of the 
evidence undergirding them.” 58 Thus, beyond anecdotal casework,59 
 
 53. Id. at 113. 
 54. Id. The report noted that: 
 
In day-to-day forensic science work, the process of formulating and testing 
hypotheses is replaced with the careful preparation and analysis of samples and 
the interpretation of results. But that applied work, if done well, still exhibits the 
same hallmarks of basic science: the use of validated methods and care in 
following their protocols; the development of careful and adequate 
documentation; the avoidance of biases; and interpretation conducted within the 
constraints of what the science will allow. 
 Id. 
 55. Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 745. 
 56. Id. at 747.  
 57. Id. at 745. 
 58. Id. at 748 (“[T]he very fact that many kinds of pattern evidence are believed to be especially 
powerful and persuasive proof makes inferring validity from its success dangerous. If a fingerprint error 
leads to a misidentification, might the identified individual nonetheless be convicted, or even plead 
guilty to avoid a stronger sanction at trial, in the face of evidence that seems virtually indisputable?”). 
 59. Mnookin carefully differentiates mere anecdotal caseworks from research. Id. at 749. She 
notes that: 
 
In addition, a research culture would realize that casework is not research. To be 
sure, researchers may introduce research questions into the stream of what looks 
to an analyst like ordinary casework. Covert research of this sort can provide 
some of the most ecologically valid data about actual practices. Research could 
also entail examining casework in a structured manner. But an analyst engaged in 
ordinary casework is not herself conducting research. Casework may suggest 
research problems worth exploring. It may lead to hypotheses worth developing. 
8
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she argues forensic science disciplines need realistic and plausible 
research plans.60    
Second, rarely have the courts been concerned about the reliability 
of forensic evidence, even after the emergence of the Daubert trilogy, 
which established the comprehensive evidentiary standard for expert 
testimony.61 The Daubert trilogy commands trial judges to scrutinize 
the reliability of all expert testimony.62 On its surface, the Daubert 
trilogy seemed to apply to all cases, whether civil or criminal.63 Thus, 
criminal scholars wondered how this new standard would affect 
forensic evidence in criminal cases.64 If applied properly, it was 
expected to exclude most forensic evidence because of its weak 
 
Unusual case findings may be worth discussing at professional meetings or 
publishing as food for thought. Indeed, the International Association of 
Identification (IAl) routinely publishes such materials in its journal, and they may 
provide useful platforms for discussion and expand the experiential basis 
available to practitioners. But case findings ought not to be mistaken for 
structured research or empirical data that goes beyond the anecdotal, whether or 
not such findings are published. Unlike planned research, casework does not 
permit the development of careful controls, defined independent variables, or 
structured and directed focus. Also, and critically, in casework, ground truth is not 
known and cannot simply be inferred by a conviction, a confession, or the 
consensus judgment of experts. 
 
Id. at 749 (citation omitted). 
 60. Id. 749–50 (“We do not mean to set up an unrealistically idealized vision of real research. 
Legitimate research can vary in its degree of formality and ecological validity. . . . But research does, 
and must, involve explicit study design. And research reports and publications, comporting with the 
research culture value of transparency, must be as explicit as is feasible about the nature of the study 
design.”). 
 61. They are (1) Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), (2) General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 137 (1997), and (3) Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael 526 U.S. 
136 (1999). 
 62. During the last half of the 20th century, as both the amount and importance of scientific 
evidence increased, concerns over problematic scientific evidence and expert witnesses grew. The 
Daubert trilogy addressed these problems. In 1993, the Court delivered a landmark decision, Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 579, which ambitiously established a new admissibility standard for scientific evidence. 
Daubert substitutes the “general acceptance” standard from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 
Cir. 1923), which had been the most commonly used standard for nearly 70 years. In Daubert, the Court 
emphasized the judge’s “gatekeeping role” to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence. Daubert 
suggested four non-exclusive factors for judges to consider when determining the reliability of scientific 
evidence. In a subsequent decision, the Court articulated the appellate court’s review standard for a trial 
court’s admission decision. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136. Finally, the Court expanded the scope Daubert’s 
application and allowed judges to flexibly apply the Daubert standard. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 137. Kumho 
held that expert testimony regarding technology and experience is also subject to the Daubert standard. 
Id. 
 63. However, it is worth noting the fact patterns of the Daubert trilogy of cases. They all 
addressed scientific causation and involved huge monetary damages.  
 64. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some 
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (2005) (“Many thought Daubert would be 
the meaningful standard that was lacking in criminal cases and that it would serve to protect innocent 
defendants.”).  
9
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scientific basis. It is now well documented, however, that the 
Daubert trilogy is less relevant in criminal cases than in civil cases. 
Research shows that Daubert challenges are not widely litigated, and 
are even less frequently successful, in criminal cases when compared 
to civil cases.65 Thus, most forensic evidence easily passes Daubert 
muster. 
As Professor Paul C. Giannelli has noted, the reason the Daubert 
trilogy does not rigorously apply to criminal cases is “not clear.”66 
Commentators suggest several plausible reasons. Some point out the 
fundamental weakness of the defendant in the adversarial system. 67 
They also note the resource inequality between the prosecution and 
the defense, and discovery rules that are disadvantageous to 
defendants, as possible significant factors.68 Others claim that courts 
are just afraid of letting guilty people go free. Courts have been 
relying on these forensic sciences for so long it seems inconceivable 
to many that they might be inadmissible for want of scientific 
reliability. Thus, judges tend to readily admit forensic evidence by 
relying on precedent, rather than doing a rigorous inquiry into the 
reliability.69  
Professor Christopher Slobogin provides a novel perspective.70 He 
 
 65. See id. at S113 (“Rules of admissibility promulgated by courts and legislatures do not 
function well in a criminal justice system devoid of effective defense for indigent defendants.”). 
 66. Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST. 61, 63 (2011) (“The 
reasons for this state of affairs are not clear. Funding is no doubt part of the problem. Perhaps, judicial 
inertia also plays a part.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Neufeld, supra note 64, at S110 (“Most criminal defendants are indigent. They are 
represented by public defenders, contract defenders, and private lawyers paid minimal fees by the 
government. In most states, before an assigned counsel can retain an expert to educate him or her, 
review the opposing expert’s data or conduct independent testing, counsel must secure approval from 
the presiding judge, an elected county official. The money to pay for the expert comes from a strained 
county treasury, and judges are reluctant to authorize expenditures for experts.”); Keith A. Findley, 
Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 893, 929–32 (2008). 
 68. See, e.g., Neufeld, supra note 64, at S110 (“The discovery available by statute and case law 
to a defendant who is sued for money greatly exceeds the discovery available for a defendant facing 
execution. In Texas, the state that leads the nation in executions, a criminal defendant is not by statute 
entitled to see before trial the laboratory bench notes for tests conducted on the case evidence. All that 
he gets is a conclusory report without the underlying notes. In Virginia, the state that is second to Texas 
in executions, the state’s highest court has explicitly held that a defendant facing execution is prohibited 
from reviewing the bench notes of the state forensic scientist who will be providing the most inculpatory 
evidence at trial.”) (citation omitted); Findley, supra note 67, at 929–32. 
 69. See Findley, supra note 67, 950 (“Another consequence of leaving admissibility questions to 
the adversary adjudicative process is that stare decisis can quickly become a substitute for analysis, and 
can freeze judgments about science even if the science itself continues to evolve. To the extent that stare 
decisis minimizes the need for repeated, case-by-case determination, it can do so in the wrong way—by 
locking in misjudgments about science, and preventing fluid adaptation of admissibility or other legal 
standards to reflect changing scientific knowledge.”). 
 70. Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 
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focuses on the different types of evidence that are usually introduced 
by the prosecution and by the defense.71 He argues that the Daubert 
factors72 are more amenable to the admission of “trace” evidence, 
which is usually introduced by the prosecution.73 In contrast, 
psychological testimony, as “softer” social science evidence, which is 
frequently introduced by the defense, is inherently difficult to 
establish under the Daubert factors.74 Thus, Slobogin notes that “the 
move toward the scientific way of seeing the world is much better for 
prosecutors than for criminal defendants.”75 Perhaps, this analysis in 
part explains the unequal application of the Daubert trilogy to 
criminal cases.  
In sum, forensic science has been formed and developed by 
forensic practitioners, instead of scientific research institutions. 
Therefore, despite its long history and utilization, the scientific basis 
has been relatively weak. Nevertheless, the courts have not 
appropriately excluded this evidence, for a variety of social and 
structural reasons. Because of these forces, forensic evidence has 
maintained its weak scientific quality even into the 21st century. 
C. Focus on Recent Changes 
After the 2009 NRC report was published, this state of affairs 
could no longer be ignored.  Both problems are widely recognized: 
(1) the scientific basis for forensic evidence is too weak, and (2) the 
courts do not properly vet the reliability of forensic evidence. 
However, recent focus in this area is rather disproportional. Most 
reform efforts focus on strengthening individual forensic science 
disciplines, while discussion about the admissibility of forensic 
evidence is minimal.76  
 First, there have been changes in the forensic disciplines. The 
2009 NRC Report had a huge impact on forensic practices; many 
forensic practitioners take the report seriously. Collaborations have 
 
105 (2003). 
 71. Id. at 108–23. 
 72. They are testability, error rate, the existence of standards, peer review and publication, and 
general acceptance. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 73. Slobogin, supra note 70, at 108–18. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 108. 
 76. See, e.g., Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses 
to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 301 (2013); Jules Epstein, Preferring the 
“Wise Man” to Science: The Failure of Courts and Non-Litigation Mechanisms to Demand Validity in 
Forensic Matching Testimony, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 81 (2014); Cole & Edmond, supra note 47. 
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increased among forensic scientists to establish best practices.77 With 
greater funding, more research has been conducted.78 Accreditations 
for forensic labs and certifications for forensic scientists have also 
been strengthened.79 Although the initial, ambitious recommendation 
to establish a new federal institution was not realized, stronger ties 
between forensic communities and academic institutions were 
established.80 
 This is not to say that current efforts are sufficient for reforming 
and strengthening forensic science. The 2016 PCAST Report 
revealed this point.81 After reviewing more than 2,000 forensic 
papers, the report found that many of the forensic feature-comparison 
methods still lack sufficient empirical evidence to evaluate their 
reliability under the Federal Rules of Evidence.82 Some scholars also 
point out the insufficiency of forensic administrative reforms. For 
instance, systematic audit processes of forensic labs are rare83 and the 
efforts to measure the error rate of each forensic discipline are 
scant.84 Problems with fragmented forensic laboratories and 
administrative affiliations are not yet resolved.85 Nevertheless, 
forensic communities are receiving unprecedented attention, both in 
terms of quality and quantity. Especially, since the 2016 PCAST 
 
 77. COMM. ON STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE AT THE NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE 
NAT’L ACADEMIES, IMPROVING THE SCIENTIFIC ROLE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 6–9 
(2015) [hereinafter THE SCIENTIFIC ROLE OF THE NIJ]. 
 78. Id. at 1–3, 5–6. 
 79. Id. at 3,7. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 10, at 1–14. 
 82. Id. at 1–2, 7–14 (noting that in bitemark analysis, footwear analysis, and microscopic hair 
comparison, there is no empirical studies to support the scientific validity and reliability of the methods, 
and there is only one empirical study in firearms analysis). 
 83. See Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, 746 n.49 (“[A]lthough the American Society of Crime 
Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) does audit some cases as part of 
its accreditation process, this review takes place only once every five years, and cases reviewed are not 
selected at random.”). 
 84. Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensics or Fauxrensics? Ascertaining Accuracy in the Forensic 
Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1369, 1397 (2017) (“Studies to measure error and error rates will not be 
treated as part of the profession’s basic research agenda.”). 
 85. See Risinger, supra note 22, at 237 (“Laboratories have been intertwined with police 
organizations for too long to have the police organizations surrender control over them willingly. First, 
just on a level of pure bureaucratic power, organizations do not easily agree to give up significant 
centers of budget allocation, if for no other reason than that the bigger your budget is the more important 
and powerful you are. In addition, there is the natural fear that the new arrangements will change the 
relationship and the product in ways that law enforcement will not like-it may become less predictably 
supportive of the desires of law enforcement to have particular outcomes ratified. Whatever the reasons-
so far as I have been able to determine-few speaking for law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial 
agencies, forensic science organizations, or forensic science publications have supported either 
independence or the establishment of NIFS, and most that have spoken have opposed both.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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Report provided a comprehensive (and accurate86) status quo of 
empirical evidence in each forensic discipline along with the clear 
criteria for the reliability, further changes are highly expected. 
In contrast, less attention is paid to the role of the courts with 
respect to forensic science. This is partly because there seems to be a 
broad consensus that the adversarial system is inadequate to filter out 
flawed forensic evidence. The 2009 NRC Report touched upon this 
point.87 It said that “[t]he adversarial process relating to the 
admission and exclusion of scientific evidence is not suited to the 
task of finding scientific truth.”88 The report articulated that several 
reasons, such as “the rules governing the admissibility of forensic 
evidence,” “the limitations of the adversary process,” and “the 
common lack of scientific expertise among judges and lawyers[,]” 
contribute to the courts’ ineffectiveness in dealing with forensic 
evidence.89 Because of the recognition of the adversarial system’s 
limitations, discussion of forensic evidence’s admissibility has been 
relatively scant.  
It might not be necessary to give an equal effort to both problems. 
However, the present indifference to the admissibility issue should be 
noted. It is true that the 2009 NRC Report primarily emphasized “a 
tremendous need for the forensic science community to improve[,]” 
while it merely assumed the that judicial control was unsuitable for 
handling forensic evidence.90 But it is an exaggeration to frame the 
report as abandoning the importance of the judiciary. The report 
explains that “[j]udicial review, by itself, will not cure the infirmities 
of the forensic community.”91 It is still necessary to establish the 
appropriate role of the courts. With this in mind, the next part of this 
article critically reviews the recent efforts of the courts. 
 
 86. On the same day that the 2016 PCAST Report published, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
noted that PCAST omitted to review numerous existing published studies, which support for the validity 
of each forensic evidence. But DOJ ultimately concluded that there are no additional studies for PACST 
to review. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI & TECH., AN ADDENDUM TO THE PCAST 




 87. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 53. Moreover, many legal professionals consider that the impact of 2009 NRC Report 
on legal practice should be limited. See Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 602 (“Most judges and courts 
responded to the report on the basis that it was not a legal document, did not have much (for many, 
anything) to say about specific legal (as opposed to forensic science) practice and that any revelations 
could be adequately managed through conventional legal trial safeguards and protections (such as 
vigorous cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses and careful instructions from trial judges).”). 
 90. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. 
 91. Id. 
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S APPROACH 
A. The Problem with Limited Court Review 
It may be premature to assess the total reform efforts made by 
forensic communities and courts. Because the 2009 NRC Report was 
published only nine years ago, reforms are still in progress. However, 
considering the exponential interest the report generated, nine years 
is not that short a time. Indeed, in that time a number of empirical 
studies have been conducted to review the changes made in response 
to the report. In this section, the article first analyzes the recent 
changes made by the courts, and then explores how the report has 
affected the practices of forensic disciplines.  
First, empirical research shows that the courts’ efforts in 
scrutinizing the reliability of forensic evidence are still minimal.92 
Changes in legal practice made as a result of the 2009 NRC Report 
are much fewer than was expected.93   
Professors Simon A. Cole and Gary Edmond conducted the most 
recent and comprehensive study. Cole and Edmond studied the 2009 
NRC Report’s direct effect on admissibility decisions in state and 
federal cases.94 They compiled cases citing the 2009 NRC Report, 
and found 82 cases decided between 2009 and 2014.95 After 
reviewing these cases, they found two situations where defendants 
were successful in challenging the prosecution’s forensic evidence.96 
The first situation was in cases that used a presumptive drug test.97 
Presumptive testing was regarded as a less reliable method for 
analyzing unknown substances than gas chromatography-mass 
spectrometry (“GC-MS”) analysis.98 Thus, Cole and Edmond found 
that “[w]hen unequivocally reliable methods exist, courts seem 
 
 92. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 76, at 301 (“[T]o date, the [NRC] Report has not led any court 
to conclude that evidence from any of these four disciplines is inadmissible.”); Epstein, supra note 76, at 
101 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly declined to revisit admissibility determinations or circumscribe the 
proposed testimony in pattern and impression evidence cases.”); Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 585. 
 93. See Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 613–15. 
 94. Id. at 585. 
 95. Id. at 592–94. 
 96. Id. at 598–601. Defendants were also successful with confrontation right challenges. Id. 
However, because this paragraph discusses the reliability of forensic science, the confrontation right will 
be discussed in the next section.   
 97. Id. at 599–600 (citing North Carolina v. Ward, 694 S.E.2d 738 (2010); Connecticut v. 
Martinez, 69 A.3d 975 (2013)).   
 98. Id. at 599; 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 135. In this test, “chromatography separates 
the drug from any diluents or excipients, and then mass spectrometry is used to identify the drug.” 2009 
NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 135.  
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unwilling to condone the use of insufficiently reliable methods.”99  
The second situation was when “the change is in the way the expert’s 
conclusion was expressed rather than exclusion.”100  Experts in those 
cases were required to “make clear that the evidence they are 
proffering is merely their opinion[,]”101 or “to temper the strength of 
the claim.”102 
Although these were positive effects of the NRC report, Cole and 
Edmond discounted both situations.103 They concluded that the first 
situation is very rare because, unlike most forensic techniques, GC-
MS analysis is a scientifically valid technique for testing unknown 
substances, as the 2009 NRC report explicitly confirmed.104 They are 
also skeptical of the second situation because a minimal change in 
the phrasing of an expert’s conclusion would not cure “the lack of 
validation testing and standardization at the heart of the NRC 
critique.”105 Beyond these rare successes, according to the authors, 
most challenges have failed.106 They concluded that “the most 
unfortunate development in relation to forensic science evidence in 
recent years is . . . the apparent reluctance of trial and appellate 
judges to apply existing authority, particularly admissibility standards 
(e.g., the Daubert criteria), more aggressively.”107 
 Because of these limits, some argue that more emphasis should be 
given to improving the forensic disciplines before they get to the 
courtroom. As Professor Keith A. Findley notes, “the most 
efficacious approach might be to improve the quality of the evidence 
upstream of the trial—during the police investigation.”108 This belief 
is somewhat understandable, given that “the trial process has not 
 
 99. Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 599. 
 100. Id. at 600. 
 101. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Joyner. 4 N.E.3d 282, 289–90 (2014)) (noting that “[t]his is 
sometime described as opinionization”) (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. (citing United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp.2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009)). 
 103. Id. at 599–601. 
 104. Id. at 599 (noting that “In these cases [the 2009 NRC report] is used as an authoritative 
source for the limits of presumptive testing and the need for more reliable gas chromatography-mass 
spectrometry (GC-MS) analysis in order to make scientifically-based conclusions about the type of 
substances recovered by police officers” and that “in contrast to most of the forensic techniques 
criticized in [the 2009 NRC report], the report confirmed the existence of a validated instrumental 
technique for analyzing unknown substances that was widely available but had not been utilized by 
investigators”). 
 105. Id. 601. 
 106. Id. 601–611. 
 107. Id. 616 (emphasis added). 
 108. Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary 
Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 758 (2013). Findley refers to a similar view in 
Randolph N. Jonakait, Making the Law of Factual Determinations Matter More, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
673, 675 (1992). 
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proven to be very effective at sorting true from false evidence in 
these suspect categories.”109 Also, since substantial efforts and 
resources have been put into forensic fields since the 2009 NRC 
Report, it is fair to expect that positive changes will take place sooner 
or later. For these commentators, reforms in forensic practice are 
expected to minimize “the strain on the truth-seeking functions of the 
adversary adjudicative process.”110 Thus, although the current 
admissibility standard for forensic evidence is lenient, successful 
reforms in forensic disciplines are expected to not only improve 
flawed forensic evidence but also weed out bad science from the 
courts.   
This approach, however, is a somewhat naïve expectation. The two 
stages are influenced by each other; the relationship is not one-way. 
If courts are willing to admit forensic science in its current state, 
there is no urgent need (or incentive) for forensic communities to 
conduct more rigorous scientific testing. Professor William C. 
Thompson labelled this phenomenon as a “codependency” between 
judges and forensic science.111 He explained that, “[l]ike parents who 
are afraid to discipline a wayward teenager for fear of losing his love 
and support, judges, by this account, are afraid to hold forensic 
science to strict admissibility standards for fear of losing forensic 
evidence.”112 According to Thompson, the lenient application of the 
Daubert standard ultimately impedes the improvement of forensic 
science. Strengthening forensic evidence without judicial “tough 
love” might be nothing more than a pipedream. 
In addition, courts have not been equally concerned with all the 
Daubert factors. As Professor Jonathan J. Koehler pointed out, 
although the Daubert Court listed “error rate” as one of the factors 
for courts to consider, that factor has been neglected.113 This is 
because, despite the importance of error rate in judging reliability,114 
the Daubert trilogy did not provide clear criteria for lower courts to 
judge error rate.115 Therefore, forensic disciplines have not cared 
 
 109. Findley, supra note 108, at 758. 
 110. Id. at 759. 
 111. Thompson, supra note 34, at 38. 
 112. Id. at 38–39. Thompson urged that “courts need to exercise a little ‘tough love’ and not 
continue to tolerate (and thus enable) the deficiencies identified in the NRC report.” Id. at 39 n.14. He 
continued that “Otherwise, . . . you'll be co-dependent forever.” Id. 
 113. Jonathan J. Koehler, supra note 84, at 5. Koehler suggests a new type of proficiency test to 
identify error rates “under various real-world conditions,” because he thinks the current proficiency tests 
are not adequate for measuring accuracy. Id. at 9. 
 114. Id. at 21 (noting that “error rate is the single most important component of a reliability 
assessment”) (emphasis original). 
 115. Koehler noted that: 
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much about measuring error rate. Even though the 2009 NRC Report 
emphasized the rigorous estimation of error rate in the Daubert 
factors,116 the forensic community has not changed much, largely 
because the courts still believe that “the lack of reliable error rate is 
not a serious problem.”117As Koehler indicated, “[i]n most areas of 
forensic science, we can’t even begin to estimate accuracy rates (or 
error rates).”118 Actually, the comprehensive review of forensic 
literature analyzed in 2016 PCAST Report confirmed Koehler’s 
assertion. The report found clear empirical evidence of the reliable 
error rate in DNA analysis (for Single-Source and Simple-Mixture 
Samples119) and Latent Fingerprint Analysis, and recognized some 
limited evidence in Firearms Analysis, and DNA analysis (for 
Complex Mixtures120).121 In other areas, the report found that there is 
still no relevant empirical evidence.122  
After all, forensic disciplines seem to have not yet embraced real 
scientific features. Although the 2009 NRC Report emphasized the 
need for independent and rigorous research, those efforts in the 
National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”)—the most important forensic 
research institution—are still limited.123 A recently published report 
 
Although many courts that reviewed forensic science evidence under the Daubert 
standard have tried to consider how well each of the five factors are met in the 
target case, discussions of the error rate factor have largely been superficial. One 
reason for this is that neither Daubert nor its progeny clarified what courts are 
supposed to look for when they consider the “known or potential rate of error” of 
a forensic method. A natural interpretation would seem to be that courts should 
check to see if the casework error rate for a challenged forensic method is 
sufficiently low in cases where error rate is a relevant consideration. But even if 
this interpretation were correct and adopted by courts, key questions would 
remain. What type of proof should courts rely on as proof of a low casework error 
rate? How low is low enough? Does the evidentiary opponent have an obligation 
to show that the error rate is insufficiently low? These questions, which have not 
been addressed by the Court….  
  
Id. at 20, 21. 
 116. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 117–22. 
 117. Koehler, supra note 84, at 28. After reviewing decisions addressing error rate issues, he 
concluded that the 2009 NRC Report failed to bring “a sea change” to the measuring of error rates for 
fingerprints, firearms and tool marks, or even DNA evidence. Id. at 23-28. 
 118. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
 119. This analysis is “the vast majority of DNA analysis” and involves “samples from a single 
individual or from a simple mixture of two individuals (such as from a rape kit).” 2016 PCAST Report, 
supra note 84, at 7. 
 120. This analysis involves “complex mixture of biological samples from multiple unknown 
individuals in unknown proportions. (Such samples arise, for example, from mixed blood stains, and 
increasingly from multiple individual touching a surface).” Id. 
 121. See Id. at 7–14. 
 122. Id.   
 123. THE SCIENTIFIC ROLE OF THE NIJ, supra note 77, at 3. This report also explains “a unique 
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found that “the priority issues emphasized in the [NIJ’s] solicitations 
appear to be reactive,” and the current research “does not adequately 
represent the needs of the broad range of forensic science 
disciplines.”124 Even though new federal forensic agencies, like the 
NCFS, were launched, they are consistently criticized for leadership 
problems.125 In addition, even after the 2016 PCAST Report was 
published, many forensic-science organizations still suggested that 
“the validity and reliability of [forensic feature-comparison method] 
could be established without actually empirically testing the method 
in an appropriate setting.”126 However, as the report rightly noted, 
“empirical testing is the only way to establish the validity and degree 
of reliability of such an empirical method.”127 This wide spread 
recognition in forensic communities would impede forensic science 
to embrace real scientific features, even though the discussion about 
the research culture at individual crime laboratories began.128 
Therefore, in forensic science, it is still not clear whether the self-
correction mechanism, one of the key features of science, can work 
properly.   
B. The Ineffectiveness of Strengthening Traditional Adversary Rights  
Although there have been some efforts to strengthen tradition 
adversary rights (constitutional protections), the effects may not be as 
powerful as expected. Courts and scholars have recognized that the 
Daubert standard is limited when responding to the deficiencies of 
forensic science. Therefore, they have attempted to equip the defense 
with tools for challenging the prosecution.  In some sense, these tools 
are expected to complement (1) insufficient reforms to the actual 
reliability of forensic science and (2) lenient court review. However, 
it is not clear to what degree these changes can combat the prejudicial 
effect of flawed forensic evidence.129   
The defense’s tools include confrontational rights and ineffective 
 
and critical role” of National Institute of Justice in forensic science research. Id. 
 124. Id. at 4. The report recommends that the National Institute of Justice should “develop a 
formal and comprehensive strategic plan for its forensic science research,” and “establish a research 
advisory board that includes a broad array of scientists, including forensic science researchers and 
practitioners.” Id. at 5. 
 125. See Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. judge quits commission to protest Justice Department forensic 
science policy, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/us-judge-
quits-commission-to-protest-justice-department-forensic-science-policy/2015/01/29/cbed0a84-a7bb-
11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html?utm_term=.c8e03f815f77. 
 126. See 2017 PACST ADDENDUM, supra note 86, at 3–4. 
 127. Id. at 4. 
 128. See Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 775–78. 
 129. See Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 598–99. 
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assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme Court quickly responded 
to the 2009 NRC Report.130 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that forensic evidence could not be 
presented by certification or affidavit; forensic evidence must instead 
be presented by live testimony subject to cross-examination.131 The 
Court substantially cited the 2009 NRC Report and held that 
defendants should have the right to confront forensic scientists.132 In 
Hinton v. Alabama, the Court reinforced the defendant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel when using and challenging forensic 
science. 133 It held that counsel’s failure to seek additional funding to 
hire a better expert constituted deficient performance and prejudiced 
the defendant.134 As Professor Brandon L. Garrett noted, “the 
[Hinton] Court had strengthened the obligations of defense counsel to 
litigate forensics.”135  
However, these enhanced rights are doubtful to be ineffective at 
screening forensic evidence. This is not to say that strengthening 
those rights are meaningless; they are the valuable fruits of recent 
efforts to improve forensic evidence. It might be also true that the 
Court has made sincere efforts in areas where it has a high 
institutional competence. Nevertheless, as co-chairs of the Senior 
Advisors to the PCAST Working Group, Judge Harry T. Edwards 
and Professor Jennifer L. Mnookin noted, “experience has shown 
that, at least in criminal trials, the suggestion that the adversarial 
system represent an adequate means of demonstrating the 
unreliability of forensic evidence is mostly fanciful.”136 Perhaps, 
 
 130. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317–21 (2009). 
 131. Id. The petitioner argued that the admission of forensic certificates in lieu of live testimony 
of the forensic analysts who conducted the forensic examinations at issue violated his confrontation 
right under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 308–9. The Court first determined the class of testimonial 
statements by citing Crawford v. Washington. Id. at 309–10 (discussing types of testimonial evidence) 
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)). Because “[t]he documents at issue here, 
while denominated by Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits,” the Court reasoned, 
“[t]hey are incontrovertibly a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact.” Id. at 310 (some quotation marks and citations omitted). The majority rejected the 
dissenting opinion arguing that there has been an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific 
evidence, and deemed the opinion as mere an attempt to resurrect Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) 
(holding that the adequate indicia of reliability is required for hearsay to meet the Confrontation Clause 
standard), which was overruled by Crawford five years before Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 312–13. Crawford 
overruled Roberts by differentiating testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 132. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. 
 133. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014). 
 134. Id. at 1088–89. Although additional funding to hire an expert was available at the time of 
trial, counsel mistakenly believed that the “funding was capped at $1,000.” Id. at 1088. The Court held 
that the defense counsel failed to introduce a competent tool mark examiner. Id. at 1089. 
 135. Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1147, 1148–49 (2016) (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014)). 
 136. Harry T. Edwards and Jennifer L. Mnookin, A wake-up call on the junk science infesting our 
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these changes could be partial remedy and may fail to counteract 
insufficiently reviewed forensic evidence.  
In a similar vein, there are efforts to enhance Brady obligations.137 
For instance, in 2015, the West Virginia Supreme Court extended 
Brady obligations to plea negotiations.138 In Buffey v. Ballard, the 
court held that the suppression of exculpatory DNA evidence in plea 
negotiations violated the defendant's due process rights.139 Some 
scholars also argue that forensic “laboratories [should] consider 
extending something akin to Brady duties to [forensic] examiners 
themselves.”140 Given that Brady is already applied to the 
information that police possess, they argue, “there is no reason that 
this should not apply to forensic scientists.”141 These proposals are 
valuable in terms of fundamental fairness.142 However, the extension 
of Brady obligations to pre-plea discovery is only limited to one 
small state, West Virginia, and the discussion of applying Brady 
duties to scientists has just started.     
IV. POLICY DIRECTION  
A. The Need to Read Daubert Leniently for Defendants 
The reliability of forensic evidence will not be strengthened 
without external pressure—and in particular, without pressure from 
the courts. Also, it is not clear if enhancing traditional trial rights will 
help to filter out forensic evidence with a weak scientific grounding. 
Thus, the courts should consider more influential changes.  
A simple solution would be urging the strict review of scientific 
reliability, as the Daubert standard was initially expected to bring. It 
 




 137. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the 
prosecution to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense). 
 138. Buffey v. Ballard, 2015 WL 7103326 (W.Va. 2015). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 776. This article articulates the reason in this way: “[T]here 
is no reason that [Brady violation] should not apply to forensic scientists. . . . The purpose of either a 
disclosure requirement or enhanced reporting norms is in part to increase the degree of perceived and 
subjectively felt independence from law enforcement, even if no formal institutional realignment takes 
place.” See id. 
 141. Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)).  They expect this duty to increase “the 
degree of perceived and subjectively felt independence from law enforcement,” which would lessen the 
“structural risks of both bias and partisanship stem[ming] from the institutional location of crime 
laboratories.” Id. at 774, 776. 
 142. Id. at 776. 
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is, however, somewhat unrealizable. Cole and Edmond openly 
describe their perception about how legal professionals might 
recognize forensic reform. They note that: 
 
Most lawyers and judges seem to believe that when it comes to the 
forensic sciences the current approach to admissibility standards—
a relatively light touch in response to expert opinion evidence 
adduced by the state that effectively circumvents interest in 
validity and reliability—is sufficient, indeed appropriate. 
Demanding interpretations of Daubert are not applied to the state's 
forensic science evidence. For most prosecutors, judges, forensic 
analysts as well as the public at large, notwithstanding high profile 
wrongful convictions exposed through innocence projects, the 
overall rate of legal mistakes can be understood as miniscule, and 
used to valorize extant legal traditions and practice in support of a 
preference for gradual engagement and reform on a case by case 
basis.143 
 
This widespread recognition among legal practitioners shows the 
inherent difficulty in depending on a strict application of reliability 
review to forensic evidence.    
Meanwhile, the current practices negatively impact defendants. As 
explained above, courts tend to apply a lenient standard only when 
admitting the state's forensic science evidence. As Professor David L. 
Faigman noted, it is the prosecution that is often allowed to present 
forensic evidence without a minimal scientific basis.144 For example, 
drug detectives usually testify about their special knowledge, without 
any empirical basis; their testimonies mostly rely on their training 
and longtime experience.145 Such testimony is usually admitted.146 
 
 143. Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 616 (citing Scalia J. in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 
(2006)) (emphasis added). 
 144. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 1:35, Applying Daubert: Criminal 
cases (2017–2018 Edition), Westlaw (database updated December 2017) (noting that: 
 
An important issue pertinent to Daubert's application to criminal cases concerns 
the rigor with which courts will assess forensic evidence. Prosecutors rely heavily 
on empirical techniques that remain largely untested, techniques, such as 
handwriting identification and bitemarks, that have a long tradition of admission, 
but whose continuing vitality under Daubert remains in doubt. Indeed, the vitality 
of Daubert itself might be assessed on whether the courts embrace the 
gatekeeping function seriously enough to challenge forensic scientists to live up 
to the title scientist). 
 
 145. See Joelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for 
the Prosecution, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 33–35 (2004) (“There is no indication in any related literature that 
there has ever been a real effort to study or test the reliability of any drug jargon definitions.”). Id. at 34. 
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The same is true regarding the prosecution’s social syndrome 
evidence (e.g., Shaken Baby Syndrome) despite lacking a concrete 
scientific basis.147 It only dubiously clears the Daubert standard, but 
is nonetheless routinely admitted, largely because of conventional 
practice.148  
In contrast, defense-proffered evidence tends to be scrutinized 
more strictly. Professor D. Michael Risinger conducted an in-depth 
empirical study of state and federal cases after Daubert. 149 For 
criminal cases in federal district courts, he found that two-thirds of 
the prosecution challenges to defense proffers were accepted (28/42), 
but only 8% of defense challenges to prosecution proffers were 
accepted (1/11).150 Risinger also noted that “[e]vidence from state 
courts does not reveal a greatly dissimilar pattern.”151 A more recent 
study, conducted by Professor Jennifer L. Groscup, revealed an even 
more strikingly disproportionate result.152 It revealed that more than 
95% of the prosecution’s forensic experts are admitted at trial, while 
fewer than 8% of the defense’s forensic experts are allowed to 
testify.153 Of course, as Risinger points out, the reliability of the 
defense’s forensic evidence may be relatively weak compared to the 
prosecution’s, and dissimilar litigation strategies could also 
contribute to this disparity.154 Nevertheless, the dramatic differences 
raise strong suspicions about the unequal application of Daubert 
 
 146. See id. at 3. 
 147. Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the 
Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2009) (“the scientific underpinnings of SBS have 
crumbled over the past decade as the medical establishment has deliberately discarded a diagnosis 
defined by shaking.” Id. at 11; Findley, supra note 67, at 920 (discussing the weak scientific basis of 
Rape trauma syndrome evidence). 
 148. Tuerkheimer, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. at 34. (“[I]t is . . . quite likely that judges are allowing 
this type of testimony because our justice system is structured in a way that makes its admission the 
default. “[T]he standard for admissibility is relevance and reliability, not certainty,” as courts often 
remark when allowing SBS testimony.” (quoting People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 322 (Colo. 2003)).  
 149. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty 
Being Left on the Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000). 
 150. Id. at 109–10. 
 151. Id. at 110. In analyzing state courts, he did not separate the trial court and the appellate court. 
Id. at 111 n.42. 
 152. See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002).   
 153. Id. at 346. His data, 693 criminal cases, includes both federal and state courts. Id. at 344. 
 154. Risinger, supra note 149, at 108 (“Of course, none of this goes directly to the validity of any 
given decision, and because different forms of expertise are commonly proffered in civil and criminal 
cases, these numbers do not directly establish disparate standards of dependability in the two contexts, 
but they are fairly striking in their own right. Maybe it is true that the prosecution always proffers highly 
dependable expertise, and that criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs usually proffer garbage, or that 
prosecutors and civil defendants only object to low quality proffers whereas criminal defendants (and to 
a lesser extent civil plaintiffs) object to demonstrably dependable evidence as a matter of course.”). 
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standards. At present, there is no clear evidence that this situation has 
improved. 
To reiterate: the courts have shown no willingness to strictly apply 
Daubert in criminal cases; deeply rooted norms in the legal 
profession create additional, practical difficulties when applying the 
Daubert standard against government forensic evidence; and the 
courts, whether consciously or unconsciously, review the reliability 
of evidence in a way that is unfair to the defendant.  
A change of focus is required. This article argues that courts 
should consciously apply a more permissive standard towards 
defendants’ forensic evidence. A permissive application of Daubert 
would give defendants more opportunities to introduce their own 
forensic experts, who may then present their own interpretations of 
evidence or rebut government witnesses. This helps defense to 
implement a larger variety of strategies; the defense expert may 
support the defendant’s claims with independent data, or point out 
the weaknesses in government’s expert testimony; and the defense 
expert can also expand the scope of discussion and analyze the 
reliability, weight, and even the credibility of government evidence. 
Perhaps, the existing perception that adversary system does not work 
properly for filtering problematic forensic evidence mostly points out 
the ineffectiveness of cross-examination by defense attorneys. 
Although it is sometimes an efficient tool to discredit the 
prosecution’s forensic evidence, generally, a limited range of subject 
is covered during the lawyer’s cross-examination.155 On the contrary, 
expert analysis is likely to go well beyond defense counsel’s cross-
examination.  
Defense experts can also help strengthen the reliability of forensic 
evidence. Not guilty verdicts usually reflect the jury’s 
underappreciation for the weight of the evidence in question. The 
government is then encouraged to provide more rigorous evidence if 
it struggles to obtain convictions. Prosecutors would ensure that their 
evidence is fully acceptable under the Daubert standard. They would 
also push (1) to rectify the comprehensive issues pointed out in the 
2009 NRC Report and particularly (2) to pursue “empirical studies 
designed to test error rates and accuracy in conditions akin to those 
 
 155. Lawyers wish to avoid discussion about unfamiliar concepts, which might fall within the 
expertise of witnesses. James W. McElhaney, Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses, 3 LITIGATION 41, 44 
(1977). Instead, the lawyer usually attempts to control the style of the witness’ response. Id. at 43. At the 
beginning of cross-examination, counsel requires an opposing expert to answer only “yes or no” to all 
questions. Id. By doing this, defense counsel usually discourages a witness’s non-responsive answer and 
overcomes the shortage of professional knowledge in forensic disciplines. Id. at 43–44. Sometimes, this 
is a very effective strategy. However, it narrows the scope of cross-examination. 
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found in the real world” in 2016 PCAST Report.156 Such efforts 
would gradually increase the reliability of government evidence.  
The history of DNA evidence that obtained the present high 
reliability through “the DNA war” may support this claim. In the late 
1980s, DNA technology was rapidly developing and started being 
presented in court.157 Defendants challenged the admissibility of 
DNA evidence and courts held the government to more rigorous 
scientific standards.158 This was made possible by defense experts, 
who carefully targeted the unsupported claims of prosecution 
experts.159 Although there was some resistance from law 
enforcement, forensic scientists began to use more conservative, 
scientifically rigorous methods.160 Professor William C. Thompson 
cites DNA as evidence that “successful challenges to the 
admissibility of forensic evidence are helpful in achieving 
improvements in forensic science.”161 Like the DNA war, attacks 
from defense experts on other types of forensic evidence are expected 
to ultimately improve the underlying science.     
Adversarial court challenges mirror the scientific method, and 
therefore adversarial testing can be implemented to improve 
scientific theories. According to Karl Popper, whom the Court relied 
upon when establishing the Daubert standard,162 “statements or 
systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be 
capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations.”163 
Popper regarded scientific progress as the result of proving that good 
ideas are wrong, so that they can be replaced by even better ideas.164 
He famously labeled this process as “falsification.”165 A similar point 
is found in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, which most 
 
 156. Edwards & Mnookin, supra note 136. 
 157. See William C. Thompson, The National Research Council’s Plan to Strengthen Forensic 
Science: Does the Path Forward Run Through the Courts?, 50 JURMETRICS J. 35, 40-41 (2009). 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. at 41, 44. 
 160. Professor Thompson noted that “[a]lthough these rulings caused an atmosphere of crisis in 
the law enforcement community and were characterized by some as a judicial rejection of science, the 
rulings did not actually prevent lawyers from making use of DNA evidence.” Id. at 42. He continued 
that “[i]n some jurisdictions, DNA laboratories began using a more conservative method for computing 
the frequency of DNA profiles” that recommended by prestigious scientific institution. Id. 
 161. Id. at 44. 
 162. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of History, 
Philosophy and Sociology of Science in US Federal Courts, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 309, 310–29 
(2002). 
 163. Sven Ove Hansson, Science and Pseudo-Science, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Sep. 3, 2008) (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS. THE GROWTH OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 39 (1962)), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/.   
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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federal judges rely on. In that manual, Professor David Goodstein 
explains that “[science] is an arena in which ideas do battle, with 
observations and data the tools of combat.”166 As noted, forensic 
science lacks this combative process, because it is usually developed 
in a government crime lab for targeted use in criminal litigation.167 
Defense experts allow forensic evidence to be more frequently tested 
in an adversarial setting and ultimately strengthen its scientific basis.   
Shaken Baby Syndrome (“SBS”) cases are a good example of the 
process this article envisions. According to Professor Keith A. 
Findley, SBS cases present a stark example of judicial reliance on 
forensic science, because these are cases “where the science is used 
to prove all elements of the crime.”168 Although the prosecution’s 
SBS evidence usually has weak scientific grounding,169 it has passed 
Daubert muster without serious difficulty so far.170 Trial judges may 
not be willing to reject SBS evidence, because it is the best available 
evidence the prosecution can offer. This generous application of 
Daubert helps the prosecution secure convictions. However, since the 
courts continue to admit SBS evidence with a weak scientific basis, 
and that evidence convicts defendants, the state is discouraged from 
changing its practices. If the defendant’s expert testifies in the courts, 
the battle of experts will effectively reveal the weaknesses of 
prosecution’s SBS evidence. Even if the testimony of the defense 
expert is shaky, it can be easily explored by “[v]igorous cross-
examination and presentation of contrary evidence.”171 This kind of 
information would be “of genuine assistance to the trier.”172 Given 
the narrow pool of experts available to the defense, a more 
permissive version of the Daubert standard will help the defense 
submit more forensic evidence to the court. And this would 
 
 166. David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
34, 44 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 3th ed., 2011). 
 167. See supra note 55–60 & accompanying text. 
 168. Keith Findley et al., Examining Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions in Light of New Medical 
Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 219, 223 (2012). 
 169. See Keith A. Findley, et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual 
Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 298–306 (2012) (discussing weak 
scientific basis of SBS testimony). 
 170. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (And 
Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156, 165–69 (2010) (explaining that SBS evidence became 
admissible in most court in a short time); Jennifer E. Laurin, Criminal Law's Science Lag: How 
Criminal Justice Meets Changed Scientific Understanding, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1771 (2015) (“While 
courts have begun to view the prior consensus about a unique etiology of shaken-baby injuries as 
undermined by developments in the medical field, the prosecutorial community has been far more 
skeptical.”). 
 171. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993); see Rock v. 
Arkanasa, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). 
 172. Imwinkelried, supra note 170, at 185. 
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ultimately encourage the adversary testing of government evidence. 
Opponents might argue that this proposal is logical but lacks legal 
grounds. But there is indeed jurisprudential support for this approach. 
Some scholars emphasize the exclusive constitutional right for 
defendants to present material evidence, a right that the prosecution 
does not enjoy.173 Professor Janet Hoeffel argues that the criminal 
defendant enjoys this right under the Sixth Amendment’s 
Compulsory Process Clause.174 Professor Katherine Goldwasser 
asserts that jury trials were intended to allow “the unusual, 
unexpected, or even implausible stories” of criminal defendants. 175 
Above all, they argue that there is a constitutional justification for a 
very lenient threshold for evidence presented by defendants.  
Judges also have the discretion to apply the admissibility rules 
leniently. The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), are generally 
considered to create a lenient standard for admitting expert 
testimony.176 When Daubert abolished the Frye test, the Court was 
recognizing that the FRE rule on expert evidence could create a more 
lenient standard.177 Thus, although the positivist approach in the 
Daubert trilogy caused a stricter admissibility standard,178 the rule’s 
original intent was in part to lower the standard.179 Also, both 
Daubert and Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael explicitly 
acknowledge the broad discretion of trial judges.180 This discretion, 
 
 173. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the 
Requirement of Proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom about 
Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621 (1998). 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”); Hoeffel, supra note 173, at 1360–61 
(“While the one-sided application of a favorable constitutional standard may appear unfair, it is not. In a 
criminal case, the parties are assumed to be on an unequal footing. The bundle of rights in the Sixth 
Amendment—the right to notice, counsel, confrontation and compulsory process—were intended to 
offset the inherent imbalance between the relatively powerful State and the powerless, resourceless 
defendant. The parties are also on an unequal footing, however, because the defendant's very liberty is at 
stake. The criminal justice system was designed to reflect the most undesirable verdict as that of the 
conviction of the innocent.”) (citation omitted). 
 175. Goldwasser, supra note 173, at 639. 
 176. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (noting that the “drafting history [of Federal Rule of Evidence 702] 
makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid general acceptance requirement would be at odds with the liberal 
thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion 
testimony”) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 
105, 106–7 (2003). 
 179. Hoeffel, supra note 173, at 1359 (“Daubert meant to liberalize the rules of evidence 
governing the admissibility of scientific evidence and intended that ‘shaky but reliable’ evidence be 
submitted to the jury.”) 
 180. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-592; Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 136, 
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combined with the constitutional grounds discussed above, creates a 
concrete theoretical basis for applying forensic admissibility 
standards more leniently towards defendants. Based on this analysis, 
this article’s suggestion could be achieved without seismic changes.  
B. Methods for Lenient Admissibility 
Critics might argue that a more lenient standard would allow too 
much unreliable forensic evidence to be admitted into court—a 
concern that there will be no limit to admissibility. Permitting 
fundamentally unreliable evidence would conflict with the clear 
dictates of Daubert. As General Electric Co. v. Joiner181 observed, 
“nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires 
a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing 
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”182 To address this concern, 
this article formulates specific standards to avoid opening the door to 
groundless forensic evidence. Although this is an inherently difficult 
task; tension always arises where law and science meet,183 fortunately 
the scholarship on “law and science” is very rich. Based on these 
studies, some examples of specific standards, although not exclusive, 
will be discussed below. 
This will be examined from two dimensions: (1) The qualification 
standard of forensic scientists; and (2) the validity of the forensic 
evidence. For the first dimension, the qualifications of experts should 
be evaluated to include witnesses with expertise in fields that are 
adjacent or relevant to testimony proffered by the prosecution. The 
situation is when competing experts are discussing the same 
evidence, but their expertise is different. For example, consider the 
following hypothetical:  
 
The prosecutor prepares a bitemark forensic expert in a rape case. 
The defense counsel, however, has difficulty in finding an 
appropriate bitemark expert in the community. Accordingly, 
 
152–53 (1999). 
 181. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 182. Id. at 146. 
 183. This is because law and science differ essentially. Law pursues justice in individual cases, 
whereas science seeks truth through valid generalization. Law must make timely and final decisions for 
efficient dispute resolution, whereas truth from scientific research is never absolute or ultimate. Because 
of these differences, there is tension when science meets law in the courtroom. In this vein, Professor 
David Goodstein once noted that “[t]he presentation of scientific evidence in a court of law is a kind of 
shotgun marriage between the two disciplines.” See Goodstein, supra note 166, at 52 (Federal Judicial 
Ctr. ed., 3rd ed., 2011). This conflict may be especially striking in criminal cases where the life and 
liberty of human beings are at stake. 
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defense counsel decides to hire a statistician as an alternative 
expert, because he knows that the scientific basis for the 
individualization claimed by the prosecution’s expert is weak. The 
statistician tries to show that there is no statistical basis for the 
individualization claims largely based on her own research of the 
existing literature. However, the defense counsel is concerned that 
the statistician does not have any expertise in bite mark evidence 
(e.g., degree, training, publication or prior testimony).184 
 
In this case, the statistician’s lack of expertise with bite mark 
evidence should not be an insurmountable obstacle. If a defendant’s 
expert testimony provides information that can help the jury make a 
judgment—to weigh the prosecution’s individualization claim—it 
should be allowed. 
This proposal can bring positive changes. A wide range of experts 
will continuously point out the problem—the lack of scientific basis 
in forensic evidence—and help to expose the true picture of forensic 
science to decision makers. Especially, the core issues discussed in 
the 2016 PCAST Report (foundational validity,185 validity as 
applied186) could be more scrutinized in the courtroom. Further, an 
active involvement of other field experts will ultimately propel 
forensic disciplines to achieve the ultimate objective of enhancing the 
accuracy of forensic evidence. In some sense, this aspect also 
reconciles with the point in 2016 PACST Report, which emphasized 
the need for collaboration with non-forensic scientists.187 
State v. Romero provides valuable lessons in evaluating the 
qualifications of experts.188 In Romero, the defense presented an 
experimental-design expert to criticize “the scientific reliability of 
drawing conclusions by comparing toolmarks.”189 Although he was a 
nationally known experimental design expert, the trial court excluded 
 
 184. This is a hypothetical scenario created by the author. 
 185. Foundational validity means “the scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of 
evidence being based on ‘reliable principles and methods.’” 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 10, at 43. 
 186. Validity as applied means “the scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of an 
expert having ‘reliably applied the principles and methods.’” Id.  
 187. See 2017 PACST ADDENDUM, supra note 86, at 9 (“In addition, progress would be advanced 
by the creation of a cross-cutting Forensic Science Study Group—involving leading forensic and non-
forensic scientists in equal measure and spanning a range of feature-comparison disciplines—to serve as 
a scientific forum to discuss, formulate and invite broad input on (i) empirical studies of validity and 
reliability and (ii) approaches for new technology development, including transforming subjective 
methods into objective methods. Such a forum would complement existing efforts focused on 
developing best practices and informing standards and might strengthen connections between forensic 
disciplines and other areas of science and technology.”). 
 188. State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 365 P.3d 358 (2016).   
 189. Id. at 361. 
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his testimony because he had “never conducted a toolmark analysis, 
never attempted to identify different firearms, and never conducted 
research on firearm identification.”190 The Arizona Supreme Court 
reversed the decision. The court reasoned that the defense expert was 
qualified because his testimony was confined to analysis of the 
experimental aspect of the government’s forensic evidence.191 The 
court regarded the expert as qualified to evaluate the evidence, even 
though he was not a pure expert of the specific field of evidence. 
Like Romero, the qualifications of a defense expert do not need to be 
too high, so long as he can analyze some aspect of the particular 
evidence. This mitigated standard allows a discussion of forensic 
evidence from a variety of angles.    
In a similar vein, the interpretation of “task at hand” also needs to 
be flexible when applied to a defense expert. In Kumho Tires, the 
Court emphasized the “task at hand,” requiring specific expertise on 
the issues in question.192 Experts must demonstrate their specific 
expertise on the key issues, rather than general expertise in the 
relevant area.193 Unfortunately, Kumho Tires allows an overly narrow 
interpretation of “task at hand.”194 When judges strictly apply the 
element against the defendant, it can create difficulty for the defense 
to find a suitable expert.  
This article has more to say about the second dimension, which 
addresses the validity of forensic evidence. When judging validity of 
forensic evidence, there should be different standards depending on 
the type of science. In a broad view, forensic evidence can be divided 
into two types: Framework evidence and diagnostic evidence,195 but 
the difference has rarely been discussed as a factor of admissibility in 
courts.196 Framework evidence “is a product of research that applies 
generally to all similarly situated cases,” and diagnostic evidence “is 
relevant to particular cases that might be instances of the general 
findings.”197 Put simply, the former generalizes the world and 
provides society with a general framing of an issue, and the latter 
applies the former to a specific case. Framework science is not 
 
 190. State v. Romero, 236 Ariz. 451, 459, 341 P.3d 493, 501 (Ct. App. Div. 2 2014). 
 191. Romero, 239 Ariz. at 10. 
 192. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., §37:22. Daubert admissibility – Expert Qualifications – Task-at-
hand and scope of expertise, 5 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE (2017–2018 Edition), Westlaw (database updated 
December 2017). 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) 
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 422–24 (2014). 
 196. Id. at 419–20.  
 197. Id. at 424.  
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necessarily more reliable, but it is inherently more scientific in the 
sense that it pursues a generalization.198 It follows a scientific process 
to generate knowledge. Under this proposal, prosecutorial evidence 
would be challenged by the same scientific process.   
This approach, which considers the types of science, has an 
additional advantage. The allegiance of experts in the adversarial 
system has long been a serious problem, and may detract from the 
search for truth.199 Framework evidence involves less risk for 
improper allegiances, because it inherently pursues generalization 
(i.e., a scientific theory), and juries are less prone to being misled. In 
contrast, intuitively, diagnostic evidence is more vulnerable to party 
allegiances, because it asks the expert to apply general principles to 
the very dispute at issue. In fact, empirical studies on the allegiance 
of experts within the adversarial system mostly focus on diagnostic 
evidence. 200 Perhaps, fact-finders can be more easily swayed by this 
kind of expert testimony. 
Here, this article adds one more ambitious proposal that helps 
lower the validity standard for defense experts: A more permissible 
standard for the presentation of multiple forensic studies. Although 
the courts have rarely discussed this kind of issue, the Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence directly addresses this.201 The manual 
raises the question of “[w]hen there is a Daubert challenge to an 
expert, should the court look at all the studies on which the expert 
relies for their collective effect or should the court examine the 
reliability of each study independently?”202  It finds that “some 
[courts] appear to look at each study separately”203 and that Joiner 
can be interpreted as supporting this “slicing-and-dicing” 
approach.204 However, the manual points out that “scientific 
inference typically requires consideration of numerous findings, 
 
 198. See id. at 425 (“The most important difference in this calculus is that diagnostic testimony 
cannot be admissible unless the relevant framework is also admissible, whereas the converse is not true. 
Even if framework evidence is admissible, extrapolation from it to the individual case may not be 
scientifically or legally justifiable.”).  
 199. Experts have long been seriously criticized for their tendency to testify in favor of the party 
that retained them rather than objectively delivering their expertise. Despite concerns about the expert-
dominated trial, the use of expert witnesses at trial has been continuously increasing. See, e.g., Jennifer 
L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009 
(2008).  
 200. See, e.g., Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side that Retained 
Them?, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1889 (2013). 
 201. Margaret A. Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 11, 19 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 3th ed., 2011). 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).  
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which, when considered alone, may not individually prove the 
contention.”205 It relies on the authorities of reputable institutions. 
 
[M]any of the most well-respected and prestigious scientific bodies 
. . . consider all the relevant available scientific evidence, taken as 
a whole, to determine which conclusion or hypothesis regarding a 
causal claim is best supported by the body of evidence. In applying 
the scientific method, scientists do not review each scientific study 
individually for whether by itself it reliably supports the causal 
claim being advocated or opposed. Rather, . . . summing, or 
synthesizing, data addressing different linkages between kinds of 
data forms a more complete causal evidence model and can 
provide the biological plausibility needed to establish the 
association being advocated or opposed.206  
 
Given the consensus in scientific communities, a more permissible 
standard should be applied to multiple forensic studies. With this 
generous approach, defendants could introduce more forensic 
evidence. 
C. Refutations to Counter Arguments 
Even if one agrees with this article’s proposal, one might still be 
concerned with whether it is a realistic possibility. An asymmetric 
standard, deliberately favorable to defendants, would inevitably meet 
resistance.207 Especially, given the political climate of the American 
criminal justice system, it would be challenging to implement such 
an idea.208 The prosecution already has a high burden of proof, and is 
required to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.209 A proposal imposing an additional disadvantage on the 
prosecution may have difficulty winning public approval.   
 
 205. Id. at 19–20 (citation omitted). 
 206. Berger, supra note 201, 20 (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As for 
“well-respected and prestigious scientific bodies.” the Manual lists following institutions: “the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), the Institute of Medicine, the National Research 
Council, and the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences.” Id. 
 207. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1113, 
1115–17 (2003) (noting the legal and social problems that “asymmetrical approach” are expected to 
bring). 
 208. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 780 (2006). In addition, the prosecution already has a high burden of proof, which requires the 
state to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. That being so, it might be 
practically difficult to adopt an additional different standard that is more favorable to defendants.   
 209. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required 
for criminal convictions). 
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This article’s approach, however, has a clear strength. It has 
addressed (1) the weak scientific basis for forensic evidence and the 
court’s insufficiency in reviewing its reliability,210 (2) the minimal 
changes made after the 2009 NRC Report,211 and (3) the need to 
facilitate adversarial testing of evidence in the courts by lowering the 
standard of admissibility for defendants.212 The asymmetric standard 
is an appeal to science, and it may be more acceptable to the public 
when framed that way. The reason that forensic evidence has gained 
the public trust (e.g., CSI effect) is that forensic evidence seems more 
scientific than traditional evidence. If an asymmetric admissibility 
standard would truly harmonize forensics with other scientific fields, 
the public would be open to the suggestion. The same is true for legal 
practitioners. Most lawyers want their proffered expert testimony to 
have (at least seemingly) scientific grounds. Legal professionals 
endeavored to inject scientific features into law over 150 years 
ago.213 Thus, both the general public and legal practitioners can find 
value in the asymmetric standard. 
Some may argue that a battle of experts could have negative 
consequences. Several courts have expressed this view. In 
Harrington v. Richter, although the Supreme Court recognized the 
importance of expert witnesses in criminal cases, it was concerned 
that the defendant’s expert “could shift attention to esoteric matters 
of forensic science, distract the jury from whether [the defendant] 
was telling the truth, or transform the case into a battle of the 
experts.”214 However, as noted, cross-examination’s ability to 
impeach expert testimony is limited. Due to a lack of expertise, most 
lawyers focus on procedural matters rather than the substance of the 
testimony to avoid substantial discussions involving “the expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”215 As Professor 
Brandon L. Garrett noted, “the Court put so much faith in its 
Confrontation Clause rulings that it believes that cross-examination 
can effectively ‘expose defects,’ without presenting the jury with an 
expert with a contrary view of the evidence.”216 Cross-examination 
by lawyers may not be an adequate substitute for contrary expert 
testimony.  
 
 210. See Part II.B, III.A.   
 211. See supra note 92–107 and accompanying text.  
 212. See supra note 162–72 and accompanying text.  
 213. See Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-
Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 26–30 (1980). 
 214. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 108-109 (2011). 
 215. FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
 216. Garret, supra note 135, at 1160 (emphasis added). 
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  The Harrington Court’s reasoning is largely based on a concern 
that the jury will be confused by additional testimony. As Professor 
Susan Haack has noted, jurors necessarily face a “perfect 
epistemological storm,” when determining the credibility and weight 
of expert testimony.217 The more expert testimony presented, the 
bigger the storm. However, the American legal system is 
fundamentally designed around the jury’s ability to resolve conflicts, 
no matter how complex they are. Many (but not all) experienced 
judges respect the jury’s ability to understand and decide even 
complex cases.218 Thus, before questioning the jury’s ability, it is 
important to consider whether sufficient information has been given 
to the jurors to make adequate judgments. As the lenient standard for 
the defense is focused on when state presents forensic expert too, this 
article’s proposal will prevent jurors from hearing the testimony of 
prosecution experts relying on weak scientific grounds.  
 In some cases, extremely complex, conflicting testimony from 
experts might distract or confuse the jury. This situation, however, is 
where even qualified experts disagree on an issue. The real problem 
is not an excess of knowledge, but a lack of (reliable) knowledge. 
Recently, the fallibility of forensic evidence has become increasingly 
well known. Hearing testimony from both sides would help fact-
finders make informed decisions. If more expert testimony is 
admitted into evidence, more scrutiny is available. 
If competing scientific views are repeatedly tried against each 
other, then inconsistent results could occur. In similar cases, one 
defendant might be convicted, whereas another could go free. In the 
context of expert testimony in SBS cases, Professor Deborah 
Tuerkheimer called this phenomenon “fluky justice.”219 Professor 
Keith A. Findley raises a similar concern. He notes that in SBS cases, 
“if doctors cannot agree on these complex and unresolved issues, it is 
unlikely that jurors or judges can do any better.”220  
 However, these are exaggerated concerns. In the age of the 
“vanishing trial,”221 trials are very rare. Only 5% of criminal cases 
are tried in courts.222 Out of the cases that do go to trial, the defense 
 
 217. Susan Haack, The Expert Witness: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 28 HUMANA MENTE: J. 
PHIL. STUD. 39, 42 (2015). 
 218. Prentice H. Mashall, A View from the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 147, 147–48 (1990). 
 219. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic 
Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513, 523–32 (2011). 
 220. Findley et al., supra note 169, at 305. 
 221. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. of EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
 222. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
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presents its own experts less than 2% of the time.223 “Fluky justice” 
is then a concern in only .1% of all criminal cases. However, if only 
the prosecution is allowed to present evidence with a weak scientific 
basis, the balance is shifted in favor of wrongful conviction, a much 
worse tragedy than “fluky justice.”224 Perhaps, it is unreasonable to 
expect unambiguous justice, when cases rely on ambiguous science.   
With respect to Findley’s doubts regarding jurors and judges, 
laypersons are expected to make decisions on “complex and 
unresolved issues” in everyday life.225 Medical cases are an excellent 
example. When one is diagnosed with a serious disease, an 
acceptable response is going to another doctor (with a better 
reputation) and weighing the reliability of the two diagnoses.226 
Though confusing, patients carefully consider the medical 
information given to them. A second diagnosis, whether the same or 
different from the first one, is always meaningful. Similarly, this 
article’s proposal for more expert testimony helps enhance the juror’s 
understanding of the underlying issues.    
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 To be sure, strictly enforcing and applying Daubert standard to 
forensic evidence would be a simple and desirable solution. 
However, while the unreliability of forensic evidence is becoming 
increasingly well known, the courts are still reluctant to apply a strict 
admissibility standard, particularly against government forensic 
evidence. Even the NRC’s groundbreaking report has not changed 
the courts’ practices. This article finds that without strict review from 
the courts, the forensics community will not embrace genuine 
scientific standards. Moreover, practically and informally, the 
 
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) (“[T]oday, 95 percent of criminal convictions 
result from guilty pleas and only 5 percent result from trials.”). 
 223. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 
15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 764 (1986–1987). The exact number of percentage might 
differ, because this study was conducted more than 30 years ago.  
 224. Tuerkheimer, supra note 219.  
 225. Findley et al., supra note 169, at 305. 
 226. See Kristine Crane, A Patient's Guide to Second Opinions, U.S. NEWS (Jul. 23, 2014), 
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2014/07/23/a-patients-guide-to-second-
opinions (“Second opinions are fairly routine. . . . ‘Any doctor who is any good at what they do will 
welcome a second opinion, because it will usually be a confirming opinion.’” (quoting Trisha Torrey)); 
Becky Ham, Seeking a Second... or Third... Opinion, CENTER FOR ADVANCING HEARTH, 
http://www.cfah.org/prepared-patient/prepared-patient-articles/seeking-a-secondor-thirdopinion (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2017) (“Seeking out multiple sources of expert advice is one of the best ways to gather 
this information before proceeding with a treatment plan.”). 
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prosecution enjoys a lower threshold than the defense. To resolve 
these problems, this article argues an asymmetry admissibility 
standard that is relaxed for defense. This asymmetric standard first 
levels the playing field, because the current admissibility standard 
favors the state. In addition, counter-intuitively, this new standard 
would ultimately help strengthen the government’s forensic evidence, 
which make this proposal more acceptable. This article also presents 
legal grounds to support the asymmetrical standard and provides 
specific examples of how the standard would be applied. Considering 
the continued resistance before and after the 2009 NRC report, this 
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